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Federal Pre-emption and the "Right"
of Undocumented Alien Children to
a Public Education: A Partial
Reply
By ROBERT S. CATZ* AND HOWARD B. LENARD**

Introduction
The doctrine of federal pre-emption' has long been a vehicle by

which state legislation may be struck down as an invalid encroachment
upon an area of federal responsibility or concern. Such judicial action

is a remedy to either a conflict2 between state and federal statutes, or
state action in an area normally reserved to the exclusive control of the
federal government.' This doctrine has recently been the focus of academic commentary4 as well as a number of Supreme Court decisions.'
Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
Adjunct Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
I. This doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2. The Court has adopted numerous variations of the "conflict" concept, using terms
such as: interference, repugnance, irreconcilable, and inconsistent. The clearest conflict
cases obviously present themselves when federal and state statutes stand diametrically opposed upon the same subject. These are easily recognized and pose no significant problems.
Similarly, no difficulties are encountered if the respective statutes are directed at completely
unrelated topics. It is the instances lying between these two extremes which present conceptual and analytical problems for the courts. See Hirsch, TowardA New View ofFederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 526-28 [hereinafter cited as Hirsch]; Note, The Pre-emption
Doctrine: Shfffing erspectives on Federalismand the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623,
626, 646-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pre-emption Doctrine]; Note, A Framework/orPreemption Analysis 88 YALE L. 111 (1978).
3. Pre-emption Doctrine,supra note 2, at 625, 642-46; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 529-33.
4. See, e.g., Note, ConceptualRefinement of the Doctrine of FederalPre-emption, 22 J.
PuB. L. 391 (1973); Engdahl, Pre-emptive CapabilityofFederalPower, 45 U. CoLo. L. REV.
51 (1973); Pre-emption Doctrine,supra note 2; Hirsch, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973).
*

**
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These decisions establish a significant departure from the more traditional, federally oriented pre-emption analysis in favor of a more liberal, state oriented approach.' In contrast to the frequently broad
application of the doctrine by the Warren Court, the Burger Court has
adopted a pre-emption analysis which has had the effect of enhancing
local and state autonomy.
In 1976, the Supreme Court refused to hold pre-empted a California statute prohibiting the employment of aliens "not entitled to lawful
residence." 7 The Court resorted to a state oriented, somewhat deferential pre-emption analysis and established "a viable and uniform standard by which to decide future pre-emption questions." ' That case, De
Canas v. Bica,9 in addition to spawning wide-spread commentary, 10 induced the present authors to herald the end of the implied federal preemption doctrine." It was contended that the Supreme Court, as evidenced by De Canas, has returned to the theory of "cooperative federalism"' 2 which prevailed during the early 1930's. The Supreme Court's
return to that methodology indicates its sensitivity to the problems
faced by the states 13 and "portends a period wherein state legislation
6. For more extensive discussion, see Pre-emption Doctrine, supra note 2. See also

comment, Goldstein v. California, Breaking Up Federal Copyright Pre-emption, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 960 (1974).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). The statute reads in full as follows:
"(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence
in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident
workers. (b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by a fine
of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for
each offense. (c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action against the
employer based upon violation of subdivision (a)."
8. Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Pre-emption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 295 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Catz & Lenard].
9. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Benke, Doctrine of Pre-emption and the Illegal Alien: A Casefor State
Regulations and a UnJform Pre-emption Theory, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 166 (1975); Catz,
Regulating the Employment of IllegalAliens." DeCanas andSection 280.5, 17 SANTA CLARA

L. REV. 751 (1977); Note, Pre-emptionin the Fieldof Immigration: Decanas v. Bica, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 282 (1976); Note, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 198 (1977) Note, 12 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 87 (1977); Note, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 963 (1976); Note, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 907
(1976); Note, Regulation ofIllegal 41iens: SanctionsAgainst Employers Who Knowingly Hire
Undocumented Workers, 4 W. ST. U. L. REV. 41 (1976).
11. Catz & Lenard, supranote 8.
12. "Cooperative federalism" regards federal and state governments as "mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended to
realize the current purposes of government according to their applicabihty to the problem in
hand." Pre-emptionDoctrine,supra note 2, at 623, quoting from Wright. The Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations: Unique Features and Policy Orientation, 25 PuB.
AD. REV. 193, 199-200 n.26 (1965).
13. In New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), a case involv-
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4
will be permitted to supplement federal legislative schemes."'
Nearly six months prior to the De Canas decision, Texas, in an
effort to alleviate the perceived problems posed by undocumented
aliens, amended a section of the Texas Education Code.' 5 Prior to the
16
amendment, public education was provided free to "all children."'
The statute had been interpreted to include undocumented children
within its ambit.' 7 As amended,'" however, children of undocumented

aliens were required to pay tuition. As interpreted by a federal district
court in Texas, 19 the purpose underlying this exclusion was, in part, "to
prevent the potential drain on [educational] funds should Tyler become
a haven for illegal aliens."2 The amended statute was the subject of a
ing welfare services, the Court, per Justice Powell, recognized that "[t]o the extent that the
Work Rules embody New York's attempt to promote self-reliance and civic responsibility,
to assure that limited state welfare funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely incapacitated
and most in need, and to cope with the fiscal hardships enveloping most state and local
governments, this Court should not lightly interfere. The problems confronting our society
in these areas are severe, and state governments, in cooperation with the Federal Government, must be allowed considerable latitude in attempting their resolution." Id. at 413.
14. Catz & Lenard, supra note 8, at 320.
15. Tnx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
16. Tnx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 21.031 (Vernon 1972) (amended 1975) provided a
free public education to any child who was a resident of the school district.
17. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-586, April 18, 1975, interpreted this section specifically
to include undocumented children.
18. The amended section of the Texas Education Code reads:
(a) All children who are citizens ofthe United States or legally admitted aliens and who are
over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any
scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year.
(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien
and who is over the age of five years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of
September of the year in which admission is sought shall be permitted to attend the public
free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person
having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission.
(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the
public free schools of the district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the
United States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not over 21 years of age
at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.
(d) In order for a person under the age of 18 years to establish a residence for the purpose
of attending the public free schools separate and apart from his parent, guardian, or other
person having lawful control of him under an order of a court, it must be established that his
presence in the school district is not for the primary purpose of attending the public free
schools. The board of trustees shall be responsible for determining whether an applicant for
admission is a resident of the school district for purposes of attending the public schools.
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 21.031 (emphasis added).
19. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), appeal pending, No. 78-3311 (5th
Cir.). See also, Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977).
20. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 1978). See also, Note, The Equal
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recent law review article by Robert Kane and Felix Velarde-Mufioz in
which the authors contended that under a federal pre-emption analysis
the statute would necessarily be invalid. 2 1 The Texas statute was successfully challenged in federal district court 22 on several constitutional
grounds, one of which was the federal pre-emption doctrine as developed by De Canas.23
It is the purpose of this commentary to demonstrate that the authors Kane and Velarde-Muftoz and the district court misinterpreted
the meaning of De Canas, and that as a result their analysis of the
Texas statute was inaccurate. The De Canas decision and the evolution
of the pre-emption doctrine to its present state will be reviewed. With
that as a predicate, the Texas statute will be measured against the considerations expressed in De Canas. It will be contended that so far as
pre-emption is concerned, the Texas statute is precisely the type of local
legislation which was contemplated by the Supreme Court in its desire
to "reconcile 'the operation of both [state and federal] statutory
schemes with one another.' "24
I.
A.

Pre-emption and De Canas v. Bica

Pre-emption

Historically, the pre-emptive nature of federal power is controlling
in two instances. First, a state enactment will be invalidated whenever
it deals with a subject matter over which Congress, in enacting similar
legislation, has expressed its intent to be the sole legislative force in the
area. This is commonly referred to as the "occupation" doctrine. Second, a state's attempt to regulate a given field will be invalidated, even
if Congress has not expressed any pre-emptive intent, if enforcing the
Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1069, 1079-84
(1979).
21. Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, Undocumented liens andthe Constitution: Limitationson
State Action Denying Undocumented Children Access to Public Education, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 461 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kane and Velarde-Mufioz]. For another version of the authors article, see Right of Undocumented Children to Attend Public Schools in
Texas, 4 CHICAGO L. REa.

61 (1977).

22. See Doe v. Plyler, supra note 19, which held that section 21.031 violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. But see Hernandez v. Houston Independent
School District, supra note 19, which held that section 21.031 was not violative of equal
protection.
23. The authors also argued that the statute violates equal protection and both procedural and substantive due process. A reply to their analysis based on those grounds is beyond
the scope of this commentary, instead we focus solely on the pre-emption challenge.
24. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) quoting
Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
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state statute will bring about a conflict with the federal standard. This
is termed the "conflict" ground for pre-emption.2 5 Of course, state attempts to regulate a field reserved to the federal government by the
Constitution, such as interstate commerce, will be totally void of impact. This is not based on principles of pre-emption, however, and
should not be so regarded. 26 Generally, pre-emption implies the existence of federal legislation.
The "occupation" doctrine differs from the "conflict" concept in
several significant particulars. The scope of "occupation" is much
more comprehensive. Where an intent to occupy the field is discerned,
the state is prohibited from legislating even though the respective laws
may coexist without conflicting, and the possibly enhancing effect of
the state law will not rescue it from invalidation. Further, the two concepts diverge with respect to the focus of review. In a "conflict" analysis, the state law is examined in order to ascertain whether it stands as
an obstacle to the achievement of a federal purpose. 27 The emphasis of
an "occupation" analysis is upon the federal statute, first to determine
whether an application of the occupation doctrine is warranted, and
then to delineate the intended boundaries of such an occupation. Only
then is the state statute scrutinized in order to determine whether it falls
within the previously established perimeters. Additionally, before a
finding of pre-emption by occupation is made, it must be reasonable to
presume that Congress would have intended to preclude the state action in question.2 8
Federal occupation of the field may be manifested in several ways.
First, and the most facile in application, Congress may expressly provide either in the statute itself or in the corresponding legislative history that it intends to supersede any state enactments in the particular
area. 2 9 Second, the nature of the subject matter being regulated may be
such that the two laws or regulatory schemes must either inherently
conflict or be duplicative." In such cases, the subject matter is considered to be "necessarily national in import,"'3 1 thereby rendering local
regulation necessarily impossible. This occurs when Congress acts pur25. See Pre-emrptionDoctrine,supra note 2; Hirsch, supra note 2. See also Comment,
Pre-emption as a PreferentialGround- A New Era of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208
(1959).
26. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
27. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
28. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Byrne, 568 F.2d 1025, 1028 (3d Cir. 1977).
29. E.g., Railway Labor Act § 2 Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1972).
30. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
31. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
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suant to an expressly granted power in the Constitution, such as the
power to regulate copyrights. Finally, and what has proved to be the
most difficult in application, congressional occupation may be implied.3 2 The Court may look to a number of factors in determining
when congressional pre-emptive intent is to be implied:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may touch a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject. . . . [T]he object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.33
Both the "conffict" and the "occupation" concepts have undergone
periodic variations in their application. Prior to 1941, the Supreme
Court tended to avoid "expansive judicial assessments of federally regulated subject matter, transferring to the Congress primary responsibility for accomplishing pre-emption. ' '34 Under this permissive notion,
once it was determined that a state was acting within its proper institutional sphere, any legislation enacted in furtherance of legitimate state
interests was examined with a heightened judicial solicitude. As a result, the traditional grounds for pre-emption were modified. Congressional occupation of the field was not to be implied, but rather required
a specific showing that it is "the clear and manifest purpose of Conwith a federal scheme
gress.' ' 35 Similarly, pre-emption due to conflict
36
required the existence of an actual conflict.
This permissive analysis prevailed until 1941, when the Supreme
Court's decision in Hines v. Davidowitz,37 began a period of expansive
federal pre-emption. Hines involved the Alien Registration Act of
194038 and a Pennsylvania statute 39 containing a similar registration
requirement but with the additional requirements that aliens carry
identification cards and produce them upon demand. The Court departed from its prior approach to pre-emption and instead sought to
32. It is contended that De Canashas rendered this particular application obsolete. See
note 8 supra.
33. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
34. Pre-emption Doctrine,supra note 2, at 627.
35. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra note 33 at 230.
36. Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAU, Inc., 360 U.S. 525
(1959).
37. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
38. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1306
(1970)).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon Supp. 1940).

Spring 19791

FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION

determine whether the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act stood as
"an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."4 Hines began a doctrinal shift from the
presumption of validity of state regulation to a presumption of preemption by any concurrent federal legislation.4 In contrast to the earlier, permissive pre-emption analysis, where actual conflict was required, the mere presence of a perceivedpotential conflict sufficed to
oust the state from the legislative arena.4" The "clear intent to occupy"
standard was also abandoned, with the Court indulging in efforts to
discern unarticulated congressional intent.4 3 The result was the invalidation of many state enactments.
In contrast to this trend, recent Supreme Court decisions have
once again breathed life into the state oriented pre-emption analysis
characteristic of the pre-Hines decisions. In a "conffict" analysis, the
Court will still consider the objectives of the federal and state statutes,
but in light of the deferential attitude toward legitimate state interests,
"conflicts, to merit judicial rather that cooperative federal-state resolution, should be of substance and not merely trivial or insubstantial." 44
Moreover, even when a conflict, actual or potential, is apparent, the
state enactment is to be pre-empted "only to the extent necessary to
protect the achievement of the aims' 45 of the federal law. Whether the
conflict in question will be characterized as substantial will depend
upon whether the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 46
The analysis of "occupation" has also reverted to its pre-Hines,
state oriented approach. In addition to shifting the burden of proving
pre-emptive intent to the challengers of the state enactment, 47 the
Court has specifically indicated the return of the "clear intent" standard:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its
intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute
was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Lynch,
46.
47.

312 U.S. at 67.
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
E.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1949).
New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29 (1973).
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963). See also Merrill
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973).
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra note 30, at 141.
New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, supra note 44, at 415-16.
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exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.48

In another context, the Court again emphasized that pre-emptive intent
will not be presumed and state law will be upheld unless there is affirmative evidence, based on specific statutory language or the legislative
history, that "Congress has unmistakably so ordained."4 9
Even evaluation of the subject matter area has undergone metamorphosis to the point where, although Congress has acted in furtherance of a specific constitutional grant of power, concurrent state laws
will be pre-empted only where the state enactment will be "absolutely
and totally contradictory and repugnant."5 This circumstance will be
present only when the federal act involves "matters which are necessar4i national in import,"' 5 1 and when, at the same time. an inescapable
conflict exists between the two laws. 2 By 1976, the Court thus had laid
the groundwork for the flourishing of coordinate state and federal legislative efforts. It was against this background that De Canas v. Bica5 3
was decided.
B.

De Canas

De Canas involved a challenge to a California statute which prohibited the employment of aliens "not entitled to lawful residence in
the United States."'54 Under a provision which permitted civil suits for
violations of the statute,5 5 petitioners, a husband and wife who were
lawful resident aliens, sued the respondents, a farm labor contractor
and his foreman. They alleged that respondents had offered them continued employment, which petitioners accepted, leaving jobs they had
held for a substantial period of time. Subsequently, respondents hired
several illegal aliens, resulting in a surplus of workers. Petitioners were
discharged in favor of the illegal aliens and sought reinstatement, an
injunction against the respondents' continued, willful employment of
illegal aliens, and punitive and compensatory damages based upon a
56
charge of unfair competition.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding section 2805 to be
48. 413 U.S. at 413, quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
49. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra note 30, at 142.
50. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973), quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32
at 241 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
51. 412 U.S. at 554 (emphasis in original).
52. Id.
53. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
54. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805, supra note 7.
55. Id.
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West Supp. 1976); Appendix to Brief for Petitioners at lOa12a, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
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an unconstitutional encroachment upon, and an impermissible interference with, a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme enacted pursuant to Congress' power over immigration. The California Court of
Appeal affirmed, 57interpreting section 2805 as an attempt to regulate
the conditions for the admission of aliens into the country in disregard
of the exclusive power of Congress to legislate in the area. Additionally, the Court of Appeal held that by virtue of the congressional enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act,5 8 any state regulation in
this area was foreclosed. 9 This conclusion reflected the court's view
that the INA was intended to be a comprehensive statutory scheme
governing all aspects of immigration and naturalization, including the
employment of aliens. After the California Supreme Court denied review,6" the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" to determine "whether § 2805(a) is unconstitutional either because it is an
attempt to regulate immigration and naturalization or because it is preempted under the Supremacy Clause
.
. of the Constitution, by the
'6 2
Immigration and Nationality Act."
In a unanimous opinion,6" the Supreme Court, through Justice
Brennan, first addressed the issue of immigration and the exclusive nature of Congress' power in that area. The Court acknowledged that
notwithstanding this exclusive power, the states had never been precluded from enacting statutes regulating aliens.' In this respect, the
Court made a significant distinction between state regulation of immigration, which would be an invalid usurpation of power in an area reserved to Congress by the Constitution, and state regulation of aliens,
an area in which the states possess legislative power.6 5 Immigration
was narrowly defined as a "determination of who should or should not
be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain."6 6 Further, although the Court recognized that
57. De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
58. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101-407, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1970) [hereinafter cited as INA].
59. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
60. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 447 (Justice Mosk dissented).
61. 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).
62. 424 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1976).
63. Justice Stevens did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
at 352.
64. Id. at 355. The Court further stated that had the Constitution of its own force required pre-emption of such state regulation, there would have been no need in prior cases to
discuss relevant congressional enactments.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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the regulation in question might have a "purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration,"67 that fact alone was held insufficient to
render the legislation constitutionally impermissible. The Court thus
came to the preliminary conclusion that under the Constitution's notion of institutional separation of powers between the federal and state
governments, "absent congressional action, § 2805 would not be an invalid state incursion on federal power."68
Having determined that the states are not conclusively prohibited
from legislating with respect to aliens, the Court proceeded to consider
whether Congress had, by enacting federal legislation in the form of the
INA, intended to "occupy the field." By virtue of the Supremacy
Clause,6 9 the practical effect of such an intent would be to render any
state action invalid, regardless of any possibly enhancing effect it might
have.70 The test employed by the Court in this portion of its analysis
1 which
was derived from Florida Lime & Avocado Growers . Paul,"
required that the state law be upheld unless "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or [unless] Congress
has unmistakenly so ordained."7 2
The Court refused to hold pre-empted section 2805 as an unacceptable subject for state legislation, recognizing the broad police
power of the state to regulate employment relationships in order to protect the workers within its borders. 73 The Court offered several examples of the impact of illegal alien workers upon California's economy as
justification for this deference. These included depriving citizens and
legally admitted aliens of employment, depression of wage scales and
deterioration of working conditions, and the detrimental effect illegal
aliens have upon the effectiveness of labor unions.74 The thrust of section 2805(a) was found to be the elimination of these local problems,
and pre-emption based on the subject matter was therefore inapplicable.
The Court next reviewed the congressional intent in enacting the
67. Id. at 355-56. The impact offered by the respondents was that illegal aliens normally attracted to California in search of employment, would now migrate to other states
that had no employer sanction legislation. Brief for Respondent at 5.
68. Id. at 356.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See note 1 supra.
70. See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
71. 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
72. 424 U.S. at 356, quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132 (1963).
73. 424 U.S. at 356-57.
74. Id. at 357.
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1

INA, 7 and the consistency of the statute with the California legislation. Initially, the Court noted that unless the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" in enacting the INA was to completely foreclose any
state legislation of this type, such an intention would not be presumed.7 6 In attempting to ascertain congressional intent, the Court examined the language, legislative history, scope, and detail of the INA.
This resulted in a finding that the central concern of the Act was the
terms and conditions of entry into the country and the subsequent
treatment of aliens lawfully residing therein.77 The Court found no indication of an intent to preclude state regulation of "aliens in general,
or the employment of illegal aliens in particular. '78 Moreover, given
the complexity of the matter addressed, the comprehensiveness of the
federal statutory scheme did not necessarily show that questions of the
employment of illegal aliens were within its ambit.79 As further evidence of congressional intent to allow concurrent state legislation, the
Court focused on the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 0 which
contains specific provisions prohibiting the employment of illegal
aliens and, most significantly, mandating compliance with "appropriate
State law and regulation."8 '
The Court discussed Hines v. Davidowitz82 and Pennsylvania v.
Nelson,8 3 relied on by the respondents, and distinguished those cases
based on several factors:
1. Both federal statutes at issue in those cases dealt with the specific area the states were attempting to regulate;
2. In those cases there was an absence of any affirmative evidence of congressional sanctioning of state legislation;
3. The interest in those cases was the predominately federal interest in immigration and foreign affairs, whereas the state
enactment in De Canas was fashioned to remedy local interests of great import; and
4. In those cases the burden was imposed upon lawfully admitted aliens, causing a clear conflict with the federal power over
75. INA, supra note 58.
76. 424 U.S. at 357.
77. Id. at 359.
78. Id. at 358.
79. Id. at 359. The Court quoted language from New York Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973): "Given the complexity of the matter addressed by Congress
....
a detailed statutory scheme was both likely and appropriate, completely apart from
any questions of pre-emptive intent." Id. at 415.
80. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2053 (1973).
81. 7 U.S.C. § 2051 (1973).
'82. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
83. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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immigration.8 4
Finally, the Court remanded the case to the California courts for
determination of whether section 2805 "'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress'" in enacting the INA.8 5 The Court noted that under federal
law, certain classes of non-resident aliens were entitled to employment,
whereas section 2805(a) made no provision for such persons.8 6 The
Court recognized, however, that the language barring the employment
of illegal aliens had been given a restrictive interpretation which, as a
practical matter, conformed to the federal standard."7 Thus, as was
previously observed, the conffict between the federal and state statutes
was "illusory at best," ' and "in the end immaterial." 9 The importance of De Canas lies in the fact that "it is the first unanimous decision
in which the Court has refused to presume pre-emptive intent in the
mere enactment by Congress of a comprehensive statutory scheme and
instead required some textual evidence of this intent, either in the legislation or its history." 90
II.

The Texas Statute

Congressional power over immigration is unquestionably exclusive. 91 De Canas, however, made it clear that regulation of aliens in
general, and of illegal aliens in particular, is not to be equated with the
regulation of immigration. 92 In that respect, state legislation affecting
illegal aliens is not constitutionally proscribed absent federal legislation.9 3 From that premise De Canas established an analysis for preemption questions. In the face of federal legislation, such as the INA
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 4 this approach
consists of several tests. A local statute will be pre-empted:
1. If "Congress has unmistakably so ordained": 95 if there is an
84. 424 U.S. at 362-63.
85. Id. at 363, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra note 37, at 67. An example of a nonresident alien clearly entitled to work would include employees of a foreign embassy or
consulate.
86. 424 U.S. at 364.
87. Id.
88. Catz & Lenard, supra note 8, at 319.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 320.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
92. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
94. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-244a (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
95. 424 U.S. at 356.
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expressed pre-emptive intent by Congress;
If "the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no
other conclusion"9 6 but pre-emption: if the subject matter is
exclusively federal in nature;
If it violates the Supremacy Clause by standing "as an obstacle to the accomplishments and execution of the full purposes
and objects of Congress:" 97 if there is a conflict with congressional purposes.

A. Kane and Velarde-Mufioz
In their article, Kane and Velarde-Mufioz applied these tests and
concluded that section 21.031 should be held pre-empted by federal
legislation. Addressing the question of whether there was congressional intent to pre-empt, they relied heavily upon Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. They contended that
by defining "children" under the Act to mean "all children aged five
through seventeen inclusive," Congress manifested its clear intent to
assure the undocumented alien children of a free public education. 98
Any state regulation to the contrary, they argued, would necessarily be
inconsistent with this congressional intent.
Kane and Velarde-Muftoz then asserted that section 21.031 "suffers even more seriously"99 under the test of conflict with congressional
purpose. As their primary contention they pointed to a potentially conflicting situation where, under the Texas statute, the "state is allowed to
determine a person's immigration status."'" As another example of
frustration of congressional purpose, they cited the relationship between immigration and international relations, 10 1 which are exclusively
federal concerns. Specifically, they focused on an amendment10 2 to the
Charter of the Organization of American States,"0 3 which provides:
The member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance
with their constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise
of the fight to education, on the following bases:
a. Elementary education, compulsory for children of
school age, shall also be offered to all others who can
benefit from it. When provided by the State, it shall be
96. Id.
97. Id. at 363.
98. Kane & Velarde-Mufloz, supra note 21, at 502.
99. Id. at 502.
100. Id. at 503.
101. Id. at 504.
102. Protocol of Amendment to the charter of the Organization of American States "Protocol of Buenos Aires", February 27, 1967, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847.
103. 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361.
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104
without charge .
Section 21.031, Kane and Velarde-Mufloz stated, is so "contrary to the
spirit of this international agreement"'10 5 that it might lead to an international controversy. They also advanced the policy argument that the
federal government should assume more responsibility for education,10 6 thus eliminating the need for state statutes like section 21.031.

B. Doe v. Plyler
At least one federal district court has generally agreed with Kane
and Velarde-Mufioz's contention that the Texas education statute is
pre-empted by federal law. Section 21.031 was recently challenged in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In
Doe v. Ptlyer,'0 7 the district court interpreted the primary purpose of
Section 21.031 as providing funds for the education of United States
citizens and legally admitted aliens.' 0 8 The court also found that the
purpose of a Tyler Independent School District policy implemented
pursuant to the state statute was "to prevent the potential drain on local
educational funds should Tyler become a haven for illegal aliens."' 0 9
The court found that the statute suffered from a total lack of rationality
between its objectives and the means chosen to achieve those objectives, and held section 21.031 unconstitutional as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.
Although only indulging in dicta, the court also expressed the
opinion that "under the third pre-emption principle enunciated in De
Canas,' ' 0 section 21.031 would be pre-empted because it frustrated
the purposes and objectives of the congressional scheme embodied both
in the INA and in federal laws relating to funding and discrimination
in education."' The court determined that one of the purposes of the
immigration law was to limit the number of aliens entering the United
States each year, and that the preferred manner of accomplishing this
goal was by detection at the border." 2 The court found that Texas'
attempt to withhold free public education from illegal aliens frustrated
this purpose because it allowed illegal aliens to enter and then to be
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
11L
112.

21 U.S.T. 607 T.I.A.S. No. 6847, art. 47.
Kane & Velarde-Mufloz, supra note 21 at 504.
Id. at 506.
458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Texas 1978) (per Judge Justice).
Id. at 575.
Id. See also note 154, infra.
458 F. Supp. at 590. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
Id.
Id. at 591.
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treated like second-class citizens.
The district court approved the educational policy argument articulated by Kane and Velarde-Mufloz 14 when it perceived a conflict
between the effect of section 21.031 and this country's "strong congressional commitment to education of disadvantaged children."' 1 5 In support of its conclusion the court also cited the declaration of policy set
forth in the ESEA"1 6 and the Protocol of Buenos Aires, amending the
Charter of the Organization of American States,"I7 and observed that
federal law "prohibits denial of education opportunity to non-English
speaking children through failure to provide bilingual education." 1 8
Finally, the court noted that "[n]othing in the Immigration and Nationality Act indicates that additional burdens on illegal aliens are to be
imposed at the whim of the various states."' " 19
III.

Criticism of Kane and Velarde-Mufioz and Doe v. Plyler

A. Pre-emptive Intent of Congress
As a preliminary premise, and one which is crucial to this analysis,
it must be recalled that the Court in De Canas noted that any preemptive intent must be indicated in clear and manifest terms, and that
such intent will not be presumed. 2 ° In establishing that principle, the
Court provided a distinct and manageable method of pre-emption
analysis: unless Congress expressly provides for pre-emption, either
explicitly in the statute, by its language, or in the legislative history, any
suggestion of pre-emptive force will be rejected. This constitutes a dramatic and long overdue departure from prior judicial decisions in
which the Court struggled in efforts to determine whether there was an
unexpressed intent to pre-empt.
In this phase of the analysis, then, it must be determined whether
Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate all aspects of immigration,
intended to prohibit any state legislation such as section 21.031. The
answer to this inquiry seems clear. There is nothing in the language of
the INA or in its legislative history to indicate any pre-emptive intent.
Certainly the statute is silent as to the right of the state to impose re113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
See text accompanying note 106 supra.
458 F. Supp. at 591.
Id. See also Kane & Velarde-Mufloz, supra note 21, at 502.
See note 103 supra.
458 F. Supp. at 591.
Id. at 592.
424 U.S. at 357.
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strictions upon children of illegal aliens attending public schools. Further, although the Court in De Canas held only that in enacting the
INA Congress did not ordain pre-emption of state regulation of employment of illegal aliens, the Court did establish that the central concern of the INA was the terms and conditions of entry into the country
2
and subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully residing in this country. 1
Presumably, the state's concern in the area of education is at least as
great as its interest in employment, which the Court placed among the
"mainstream of . . . police power regulation."' 2 2 It seems, therefore,
that after De Canas the mere existence of the INA is insufficient standing alone to mandate pre-emption based upon some nebulous concept
of unexpressed congressional intent.
Both Kane and Velarde-Mufloz and the Pyeler court felt that the
Texas statute must fall under the pre-emptive force of Title I of the
ESEA. Their contention misses the mark for several reasons. First,
Title I of the ESEA is simply a funding measure for a comprehensive
aid-to-state-education program. 123 This program is voluntary in terms
of state participation; the Act simply establishes certain eligibility criteria for the states to follow in order to qualify for the federal funds. The
program is designed to be administered by local public educational officials, 124 who have the primary responsibility for designing and effectuating a Title I program. 2 5 This plan is then submitted for approval
to a "state educational agency,"'12 6 which insures that the program will
meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children
in school attendance areas with high concentrations of children from
low income families. 7 If the local plan is approved at the state level,
2
it is then submitted to the United States Commissioner of Education,1
who is responsible for administering the program and awarding federal
funds. 129 In order to receive Title I funds, the State Attorney General
121. Id.at 359.
122. Id. at 356.
123. The legislative history of the ESEA provides a discussion of the purpose of the Act:
"The President of the United States in a statement issued on April 1, 1965, the day the bill
was reported by the subcommittee to the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
succinctly epitomized the purpose of this legislation. He said: 'This bill has a simple purpose: To improve the education of young Americans . .'" S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. I, reprintedin [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1446, 1448.
124. 45 C.F.R. §§ 100b.10-.15 (1978).
125. 20 U.S.C. § 241e (1976).
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id. at § 241
129. Id. at § 241b.
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must also submit and sign an assurance to the United States Commissioner of Education stating that all Title I regulations will be observed
even if they conflict with state law.13 0 It appears, therefore, that if state
law prevented a state or local agency from compliance with all relevant
Title I requirements, and the state could or would not comply, the
funds would be withheld by the Commissioner.
Assuming, then, that the ESEA mandates the availability of free
education to all children, including children of illegal aliens, the net
effect of the Texas statute would be to prevent the state from fulfilling
the requirements of Title I of the Act. Texas would, as a result, be
ineligible for any Title I funds,"3 ' and would then be forced to make a
political decision as to the desirability of either repealing the statute or
depriving all of its educationally disadvantaged children of the benefit
of Title I funds.3 2 This choice has no bearing whatsoever on the issue
of pre-emption. Instead, it is a matter of meeting the requirements of
ESEA or not receiving funds under that Act.
The ESEA is an attempt to provide liberal educational benefits,
and Congress has chosen to do so by providing incentives for the states
to participate voluntarily in the program. But until such time as the
state has chosen to participate, it is virtually free to provide whatever
manner of education it chooses. Of course, other constitutional
prohibitions might bar improper legislation, but that does not implicate
a pre-emption analysis. Accordingly, although the PIler court may
have been responding to great moral pressure, its legal application of
the pre-emption doctrine was erroneous and presents a situation where
the court strayed from what seems to be "sound and established constitutional principles in order to reach a just result in a particular case;
this gives meaning to the ancient warning that 'hard cases make a bad
law.' "133
The Pl/er court found no indication in the INA that states may
impose additional burdens on aliens. But since De Canas, where the
Court noted that state legislation would not be presumed to be foreclosed absent a clear purpose of Congress, the argument advanced by
the Plyler court has not been significant in establishing pre-emptive intent. Additionally, as De Canas and its predecessors clearly estab130. Id. at § 241f(a)(1).
Id. at § 241j. See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DisADVANTAGED CHILDREN, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 29
(1972), where the Council specifically recommended and urged strong enforcement of all
Title I regulations, even if conflicting with state law.
132. See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-23 (1970).
133. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131.
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lished, the contention of pre-emption based upon the
comprehensiveness of the congressional legislative scheme has been
uniformly rejected.134 As the Supreme Court stated in a different field
of inquiry: "The subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation
often by their very nature require intricate and complex responses from
the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment
as the exclusive means of meeting the problem."' 35 The De Canas
Court acknowledged that the complexity of the subject of immigration
and naturalization required comprehensive legislation, yet refused to
find any
pre-emptive intent regarding state regulation of illegal
36
aliens.

The Plyler court believed that additional support for the preemption of the Texas statute could be gained from consideration of
Kent v. Dulles137 in that "[t]he questions of section 21.03 1's consistency
with congressional intent and of its validity under the equal protection
clause are intimately related. Congressional sensitivity to the constitutional rights of those it regulates is traditionally assumed by courts in
assessing congressional intent.' 38 But the P ler court's application of
this principle to the facts before it was of doubtful validity. The court
intimated that since the illegal aliens had established roots in this country, they, like legal aliens, were entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, including the right to free education. Even assuming that free
education is a constitutionally protected right of legal aliens, it is not
clear that illegal aliens can claim the same right simply because they
have managed to reside illegally in the country for some time. And
even if that were true, a statute's invalidity with respect to the equal
protection guarantee is not a basis for pre-emption.
Kane and Velarde-Mufioz pointed out that the De Canas Court
cited the Federal Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act as an example of the lack of congressional intent to prohibit state regulation of
illegal alien laborers. 39 They deemed it significant that there is no federal statute that similarly contemplates state regulation of the education
of undocumented children. 4 ' But in doing so, Kane and VelardeMufioz overestimated the De Canas Court's reliance on the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act for its pre-emption analysis. The
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

424 U.S. at 359-60.
New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 415 (1973).
424 U.S. at 359.
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
458 F. Supp. at 591.
424 U.S. at 361-62.
Kane & Velarde-Mufioz, supra note 21 at 502.
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FLCRA was not considered in the Court's determination of congressional intent. The Court had already found, before even turning to the
FLCRA, that there was no congressional intent to pre-empt statutes
like California's section 2805. That state action was permissible under
the FLCRA was not indispensable to the finding of a lack of congressional intent to pre-empt. Instead, the FLCRA was used only as an
example to demonstrate that the Court's decision was reasonable.
Therefore, that Kane and Velarde-Mufloz have found no federal statute allowing state regulation of undocumented aliens is not a significant, much less a controlling, consideration in a pre-emption analysis.
There is a dearth of evidence of any congressional intent to prohibit state legislation like Texas' section 21.031. Therefore, in light of
the Supreme Court's hesitancy to strike down facially valid state laws
absent a clear showing of a congressional mandate, the arguments put
forth by Kane and Velarde-Mufloz and by the Pller court fall far short
of the required "clear manifestation of intention" to supersede the
otherwise legitimate exercise of power by the state. 141
B. Exclusively Federal Subject Matter
Under the second of the De Canas criteria for pre-emption, the
subject matter of the state and federal laws must be of such a nature
that any state regulation must either duplicate or conflict with the federal regulation. 42 Such duplication or conflict must be inherent in the
federal regulatory scheme in order for local regulation to be precluded.
In De Canas, the employment of aliens was held not to be a subject
matter which "permits no other conclusion' 143 than pre-emption. This
was based on the broad authority enjoyed by the states, under their
police power, to regulate and control the employment relationship.'"
In acting to remedy the extensive impact of illegal aliens upon the local
economy, California was "certainly within the mainstream of such police power regulation."' 45
The nature of the subject matter of the Texas statute, education, is
also one which does not preclude concurrent local regulation. While
Kane and Velarde-Muftoz urged that the federal government should
141. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, supra note 130, at 413, quoting
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
142. 424 U.S. at 356. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963).
143. 424 U.S. at 356.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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assume more responsibility for education, 14 6 this responsibility has historically been left to the states, and has traditionally been a subject of
state and local concern under the police powers. As the Supreme Court
has noted when dealing with local regulation of education: "The very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide
public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,' and that, within the
limits of rationality, 'the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems'
should be entitled to respect."' 147 Although the cases establishing this
local supremacy in the area of education have arisen mainly in the area
of equal protection, 48 the overriding principles still apply. These principles clearly establish the lack of "doubt as to the power of a State,
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose rea49
sonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education."
In a decision plainly illustrative of the deference to local control over
public education, the Supreme Court unmistakably laid this issue to
rest: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
for public schools and to quality of the educaconcern and support
150
tional process."'
C.

Conflict with Congressional Purposes

The third test enunciated in De Canasrequires a court to examine
the two statutes and then to determine the existence and extent of any
conflict between them. 5 ' If the state law is found to conflict totally
with the federal law, pre-emption is compulsory. On the other hand,
the state law should be upheld unless the purposes and objectives of the
federal scheme will be frustrated. 52 Kane and Velarde-Mufioz and the
Plyler court both stressed the close relationship between matters of immigration and international relations and contended that the Texas
statute somehow conflicts with an amendment to the OAS Charter. But
the Texas statute and the Charter Amendment are totally unrelated,
146. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
147. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973), quoting from Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972).
148. Eg., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
149. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
150. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
151. 424 U.S. at 363. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
152. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132. 141 (1963).
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and, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Charter Amendment
does not require pre-emption of the statute.
The purposes of the OAS as set forth in the Charter, which was
signed at BogatA in 1948, were only to elevate and promote the respective countries' economic and social conditions by establishing certain
goals that each country would strive to achieve within its own system.
There is no intimation anywhere in the Charter, nor in the Protocol,
indicating an intent that it be an agreement of non-discrimination between the countries. Moreover, the Protocol was not intended to
achieve or mandate the contrary; one of the expressed purposes was
framed in terms of countries "defending their sovereignty, their territorial integrity ..
.*"'I This was simply one of many agreements of the
kind commonly entered into by countries whereby they espouse their
intention to elevate their own economic and social status by adopting
certain goals. The spirit of this Agreement is not frustrated by Texas'
rational discrimination against illegal aliens since it was not intended
to address that issue. The Agreement does not carry any force of preemption with respect to section 21.031.
Kane and Velarde-Mufioz believed that the Texas statute "requires a state or local agency to inquire into and determine each child's
immigration status," and that this inquiry causes a conflict with
congressional purpose.'5 4 Actually, their belief is without a basis in fact.
A person's immigration status is determined by federal law,' 55 and
Texas would only inquire to ascertain the nature of the alien's status.
This in no way encroaches upon any exclusive federal activity. Rather,
it is a legitimate inquiry that furthers the policies of the INA by removing another incentive for illegal aliens to immigrate.
De Canas clearly indicated that the central concern of the INA
was the "terms and conditions of admission to the country."'' 56 It
would be an unreasonable interpretation of section 21.031 to say that it
153. 21 U.S.T. 659.
154. Kane & Velarde-Muftoz, supra note 21 at 501.
155. In July, 1977, the Board of Trustees of the Tyler School District adopted the following policy, which clearly relies on federal law, and does not require an independent determination of immigration status. "The Tyler Independent School District shall enroll all
qualified students who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens, and who
are residents of this school district, free of tuition charge. Illegal alien children may enroll
and attend schools in the Tyler Independent School District by payment of the full tuition
fee. A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he or she is legally in the
United States, or a person who is in the process of securing documentation from the United
States Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is being processed and
will be admitted with proper documentation." 458 F. Supp. at 572.
156. 424 U.S. at 359.
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is aimed at controlling immigration. Its main concern is a fiscal one,
and, as such, any impact it has upon immigration would be indirect
Such indirect impact would not render the state law constitutionally
prohibited. 57 The P yler court saw the Texas statute as frustrating the
purposes of the INA by allowing illegal aliens to enter and then be
treated as second class citizens.' 58 This logic is strained at best, for it is
difficult to imagine how Texas, in making free public education unavailable to illegal aliens, provides any incentive for such persons to
immigrate. In fact, it is evident that the two schemes are directed at
dissimilar goals, but with similar effects the Texas statute is aimed at
preserving the fiscal integrity of its educational funding. The immigration laws are aimed at controlling the "terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in
this country."' 159 In light of their divergent thrusts, it is hard to conceptualize any possible conflict between the two.
The challenged Texas statute discriminates on the basis of illegal
immigration status which is both rational and constitutional. Since
there is no conflict with any federal statute, and since section 21.031
thwarts no significant federal scheme, pre-emption based on conflict or
interference is inappropriate.

Conclusion
The federal pre-emption doctrine has undergone several periods of
evolution, its focus shifting from decisions favoring federal interests to
those favoring state interests. Recent Supreme Court decisions in the
area of federal pre-emption analysis such as De Canas v. Bica have
revealed a reluctance to find that Congress has acted to occupy a regulatory field. As a result, there is a great deal of permissible state power
to regulate.
In De Canas the Supreme Court removed the spectre of pre-emption on the basis of an obscure notion of implied congressional intent,
leaving only objective factors to be applied. These factors require a
court to determine whether state power to regulate is per se pre-empted
by congressional power. If not, then pre-emption will be found only
where Congress has explicitly so provided, 6 ° where the nature of the
subject matter is necessarily national and no other conclusion but pre157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 355-56.
458 F. Supp. at 591.
424 U.S. at 359.
See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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emption is possible, 16 1 or where the state law ineluctably conflicts with
or frustrates the "accomplishments
and execution of the full purposes
162
and objectives of Congress."
De Canas thus established a mode of pre-emption analysis which
is capable of uniform application. The proper starting point of such an
analysis must be that the historic police powers of the state should be
preserved, especially where the field is one traditionally occupied by
the states, as is the field of education. Then, unless it can be demonstrated that Congress has expressed a clear and manifest purpose to
occupy an entire regulatory field, a court should be reluctant to invalidate the state act. The fact that this analysis has been twice misapplied
in the examination of section 21.031 is basically a reflection of the highly volatile and morally troublesome subject of illegal aliens and their
children. Unless an appropriate federal response to this problem is enacted, states will continue in their attempts to insulate themselves from
the potential impact of illegal aliens.
It is one thing for a state statute to be invalidated as being in direct
conflict with an Act of Congress where direct repugnance or conflict is
demonstrated. It is quite another matter for the courts to strike down
state legislation, which the state could otherwise enact, by use of the
metaphor "occupied the field." Unless Congress expressly states in the
statute or the corresponding legislative history that it intends to preempt state involvement in the subject matter, the courts should abstain
from invalidating state law unless it clearly conflicts with federal law or
would frustrate a federal statutory scheme, or unless from the totality
of the circumstances it is clear that Congress has sought to occupy the
field to the express exclusion of the states.
Until such exclusive federal legislation develops, however, statutes
such as section 21.031 should survive the De Canas pre-emption test
since Congress has not expressly indicated an intent to occupy the field,
since the subject matter is clearly not national, and since there is no
objective demonstration that the statute stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of congressional purpose. It seems, therefore, that in
future analyses of similar laws under the pre-emption doctrine as developed by De Canas,the words of Chief Justice Burger should be kept
in mind:
The urge to cure every disadvantage human beings can expenence exerts an inexorable pressure to expand judicial doctrine.
But that urge should not move the Court to erect standards that
161. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
162. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
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are unrealistic and indeed unexplained for evaluating the constitutionality of state statutes. 163

163. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 463.

